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ABSTRACT
Fears that production abroad would cause home country exports and employment to fall have
not been confirmed by evidence.   Multinational operations have led to a shift by parent firms in the
United States toward more capital- intensive and skill- intensive domestic production.   However,
that type of reallocation does not appear to have taken place in Japan or Sweden.
Within host countries, foreign- owned firms almost always pay higher wages than
domestically- owned firms.  It is not always the case that they cause wages in locally- owned firms
to rise, but their presence does generally raise wage levels in host countries.
Foreign firms generally have higher productivity than local firms, but the evidence for
spillovers to local firms’ productivity is mixed. It seems to depend on host country policies and
environments and on the technological levels of industries and of host- country firms.  The same
mixture of impacts applies to host- country growth in general.
The impact of FDI in promoting the growth of host country exports and linkages to the
outside world is clearer.  The major role of FDI in the transformation of host economies from being
exporters of raw materials and foods to being exporters of manufactures, and in some cases
relatively high- tech manufactures, is also evident in some cases.  Much of the impact is from the
transfer of knowledge of world markets and of ways of fitting into worldwide production networks,
not visible in standard productivity measurements.
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365 Fifth Avenue, 5
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Protests against “globalization” involve a wide spectrum of discontents with modern life 
and market economies.  They include the growth of international trade and specialization, and 
the disruptions of traditional or established economic practices they entail.  They include also the 
actions of intergovernmental agencies, such as the ITO, the IMF, the World Bank, and the 
regional development banks.  And it is rare that multinational firms are not mentioned, as the 
presumed leaders and chief beneficiaries of globalization.   
There are also more specific accusations against multinationals.  Many evils are alleged.  
They depress wages and employment at home by moving production abroad.  They depress 
wages in their host countries by exploiting helpless workers.  They stifle host country growth by 
displacing local firms and obstructing their technological progress.  Anyone who believes these 
fears are a new phenomenon should read the chapter on “The Reactions to Foreign Investment” 
in Wilkins (1989), where the author describes how “In the mid-1880s and into the 1890s, a 
passionate, hitherto unmatched fury mounted against foreign investment in the United States” (p. 
566).  
To the extent that opposition to globalization stems from different values that view as 
bads traditional economic goods such as higher consumption or the growth of production and 
exchange, I do not attempt to deal with them.  Many of the other accusations are framed in vague 
terms.  I attempt to appraise them by classifying the effects of multinational operations under 
several homogeneous headings and reviewing what research has concluded with respect to each 
topic.  On home country effects, I summarize the findings on home country exports and home   2
 
country factor demand.  On host country effects, I discuss wages, productivity, exports, and the 
introduction of new industries. 
  There are two concepts of FDI and two matching ways of measuring it.  One is that FDI 
is a particular form of the flow of capital across international boundaries from home countries to 
host countries.  These flows give rise to a particular form of international assets for the home 
countries, specifically, the value of holdings in entities, typically corporations, controlled by a 
home country resident or in which a home country resident holds a certain share of the voting 
rights.   The other concept of direct investment is that it is a set of economic activities or 
operations carried out in a host country by firms controlled or partly controlled by firms in some 
other (home) country.  These activities are, for example, production, employment, sales, the 
purchase and use of intermediate goods and fixed capital, and the carrying out of research.   
  The former of these two concepts is the one reflected in balance of payments accounts.  
The measures of it, flows and stocks of direct investment, are the only virtually ubiquitous 
quantitative indicators of FDI.  However, if the effects of FDI stem from the activity of the 
foreign-owned firms in their host countries, the balance of payments measures have many 
defects for any examination of these impacts.  The activity is frequently not in the same industry 
as the stock, or not in the same host country, or has not originated from the same home country 
(Lipsey, 2002b, United Nations, 2001).   For this reason, wherever possible, I emphasize studies 
based on activity, such as production or employment, rather than those based on balance of 
payments stocks and flows. 
  Production from foreign direct investment, that is, production in enterprises located 
outside the country of residence of their owners, reached a little over 10 per cent of total world 
output in 2000, by a rough estimate.   That compares with about 5 per cent in 1985 and 6 per cent   3
 
in 1990.  The increase has been relatively rapid in the 1990s, particularly because countries other 
than the traditional direct investors have been raising their share of the world’s outward direct 
investment. 
II. What Happens When a Foreign Direct Investment Is Made? 
  Much of the earlier economics literature on foreign direct investment, but not the 
business literature, treated it as a part of the general theory of international capital movements, 
based on differences among countries in the abundance and cost of capital. If country A makes a 
direct investment in country B, there is an addition to the physical capital of country B, and new 
production capacity is created there.  The investing firm in A will have chosen to use some of its 
capital in B instead of in A.  If the output is tradable, some production that now takes place in 
country B may replace production that formerly took place in country A.  The investing firm 
may have reduced its production in its home country, A, possibly by shutting down or selling a 
plant, and opened up a new plant abroad to serve the same market.  
A different possibility is that a firm in country A makes a direct investment in country B, 
but the stock of physical capital and the level of production are unchanged in both countries.  
Country A owners and managers in industry X, perhaps using the skills they have acquired in 
home production, buy out country B owners with lower skills in that industry and operate the 
industry X plants in country B more efficiently than before.  Country B owners use their capital, 
released by the buyout, in other industries.  They might, for instance, lend it to other owners and 
managers in country B, skilled in industry Y, to enable them to buy out less competent owners in 
that industry in country A. No net movement of physical or financial capital is necessarily 
implied, although it could take place.   4
 
This latter picture belongs to what Markusen (1997) and Markusen and Maskus (2001) 
have called the “knowledge-capital model” of the multinational enterprise.  It is related also to 
what Caves (1996, Chapter 1) refers to as the dependence of multinational enterprises on 
“proprietary assets,” or “firm-specific” assets.  And it also fits with Romer’s distinction (1993a) 
and (1993b) between the roles in economic development of what he calls “ideas” in contrast to 
“objects”. Caves (1996) traces the decline of the view that multinationals are principally 
arbitrageurs of financial or physical capital to Hymer (1960) and to Kindleberger (1969), who 
adopted many of Hymer’s ideas.  Dunning (1970) summarized their view as being that “… the 
modern multi-national company is primarily a vehicle for the transfer of entrepreneurial talent 
rather than financial resources.” (p. 321).   
 The capital flow story depends on the advantages of countries as locations for 
production, and changes in such advantages. The entrepreneurship story, on the other hand, 
hinges on characteristics of firms and their managers, rather than those of countries.  Capital 
flows imply changes in the industrial composition of production and employment in home and 
host countries. In industries producing tradables, they imply shifts in the composition of exports 
and imports.   Entrepreneurship explanations contain implications for the ownership of 
production, but not necessarily for the location of production. 
It is desirable to distinguish the location choices within firms from the location choices 
for industries in the aggregate.  If, for example, because of a decline in communication costs, or 
an increase in the severity of currency fluctuations, firms in all countries decided to diversify 
their production locations, each firm in each country might shift production from home to 
foreign locations through FDI.  However, there might be no change in the geographical location 
of production as a whole, because in each country, the outward shift of home country firms’   5
 
production might be balanced by the inward shift of foreign firms' production.  Or there could be 
a general shift of production toward markets in each industry. 
If there is a geographical relocation of production, the force behind it might be a change 
in factor prices, such as a rise in the home country price of labor, or a rise in the home country 
price of a natural resource.  In that case, we would expect a shift in the production of labor-
intensive or resource-intensive goods away from the home country, both within firms and in the 
aggregate.  That might be reflected in a decline in firm and home country exports, but it might 
also be the case that it was the decline of home country exports, or the expectation of such a 
decline, that precipitated the production shift.  It is difficult to distinguish between trade shifts 
produced by exogenous production location decisions and location shifts produced by exogenous 
shifts, or potential shifts in trade.  The difficulty of that distinction has haunted most analyses of 
home country impacts. 
There is some indication that the exchange of ownership has become a larger part of FDI 
flows over time and particularly during the 1990s.  One piece of evidence is that the value of 
mergers and acquisitions has risen relative to the value of FDI flows and relative to world output 
(United Nations, 2000, Chapter IV).  Most of this merger and acquisition activity has taken place 
among the developed countries.  The rising trend seems to reflect an increase in mergers and 
acquisitions in general, rather than one mainly in international, or cross-border ones: the 
international share appears to have been relatively constant since the late 1980s (ibid, p. 107).  
Much of this activity has taken the form of exchanges of stock, where relatively little capital 
flow is involved.  
The idea that what appears to be a movement of production and employment may 
represent mainly a substitution of one national ownership for another can be illustrated by the   6
 
changes within the U.S. manufacturing sector.  Between 1977 and 1997, the share of U.S. 
manufacturing parent firms in U.S. manufacturing output fell from 65 to 55 per cent.  Almost all 
of that share was taken over by U.S. manufacturing affiliates of foreign firms, which produced 
3&1/2 per cent of U.S. manufacturing output in 1977, but 12&1/2 per cent in 1997.  The U.S. 
parent share of U.S. manufacturing employment declined from 60 per cent in 1977 to 46 per cent 
in 1997, while the share of U.S. manufacturing affiliates of foreign parents rose from 3&1/2 per 
cent to over 12 per cent.  Most of the reduction in U.S. parents’ manufacturing output and 
employment were offset by an increase in foreign-owned affiliates output and employment.  U.S. 
and foreign firms were both internationalizing; each group was expanding in the other group’s 
home region (Lipsey, 2002a). 
Behind the strong interest in some of the questions about effects of the 
internationalization of firms’ production there are important policy issues.  Should countries 
promote or discourage the internationalization of their home country firms, or should policy be 
neutral?  Should countries encourage the entrance of foreign producers, or discourage it, leave 
the decisions to market forces?  Some of the early studies of U.S. direct investment abroad were 
motivated by the belief that features of the U.S. taxation of corporations were important 
inducements to foreign investment.  That question may not have been settled, but the spread of 
the practice of internationalization from firms based in the United States to those from many 
other countries suggests that there were forces beyond any distortionary U.S. tax policies that 
were driving these trends.   7
 
III Home Country Effects of Outward FDI 
a.  Outward FDI and Home Country Exports 
 
Since the United States was the dominant outward direct investor in the period after World 
War II, much of the debate about the home country consequences of FDI took place first there.  
The debate over the possible substitution of U.S. firms’ foreign production for U.S. exports was 
most intense during the time of worries about the balance of payments during the 1960s.  
Curiously, earlier studies of U.S. foreign investment, such as Lewis (1938) and Madden, Nadler, 
and Sauvain (1937), did not take up the export substitution issue, despite the high unemployment 
levels of the 1930s.  In the 1960s, there was a campaign against outward investment, largely 
fueled by fears about effects on U.S. exports and, presumably, domestic employment, that was 
supported by labor unions and culminated in the unsuccessful attempt to pass the Burke-Hartke 
bill.  What did ensue was, first, the “Voluntary Program of Capital Restraints,” from 1965 to 
1967.  That was followed by the compulsory Office of Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI) 
regulations, specifically aimed at reducing the outflow of U.S. capital for direct investment in an 
effort to “improve” the U.S. balance of payments.  The focus of these regulations, which lasted 
until 1974, was the outflow of capital, rather than the growth of U.S. firms’ production abroad, 
and they therefore did not attempt to discourage the expansion of production abroad financed 
from outside the United States (Lipsey, 1995, p. 16). 
The controversies of this period spawned a series of studies relating outward FDI to home 
country exports.  There are a number of different questions that can be asked, and they have not 
always been clearly distinguished, although the implications of the answers to them differ 
considerably.  One set of questions is about the relationships within the individual investing firm.  
One can ask (a) about the relation, for an individual parent firm, between its production in a host   8
 
country and its exports to that country.  Or one can ask (b) about the relation of a firm’s 
production in a country to its exports to the world, taking account of the possibility that affiliate 
exports to other countries might affect parent markets there.  Or one can ask (c) about the 
relation between a firm’s production in all foreign countries and its exports to the world, taking 
account of all interrelationships between production abroad and exports. 
  All of these are issues of firm strategy: how a firm chooses to serve markets around the 
world.  There are no necessary inferences to be drawn about effects on the firm’s home country 
as a whole, without knowledge about how other firms in the home country or other countries 
respond or react to the same stimuli. 
  A second set of questions is about the relation of the aggregate of decisions by a 
country’s firms about production abroad to home country exports in the same industry or in the 
aggregate, or to home country or industry employment or employment of different types of labor.  
These aggregate decisions incorporate the reactions of one firm in a country to the actions of 
other firms.   
  A third set of questions is about the relation between the decisions on the location of 
production made by firms from all countries on the worldwide pattern of production, trade, and 
employment, or on any particular countries’ position.  One reason these questions are rarely 
asked is that little is known about the outward FDI activities of about half or more of the world’s 
direct investors, because most countries do not inquire into what their firms do outside their 
countries’ borders. 
  The basic problem with studies of these questions has always been the close connection 
between the factors that determine a firm’s exports and those that determine its foreign direct 
investment.  A country’s most competent and successful firms tend to export and to invest in   9
 
production abroad, and the same is generally true of the most successful industries.  All the 
research indicates an awareness of the problem, and the studies attempt to deal with it, usually in 
ways found unsatisfactory by critics. 
  The most common type of study was of the first question described above.  Exports by a 
firm or an aggregate of firms in an industry to a foreign market were related to the firm’s 
investment or production or employment in that market.  The interrelations between exports and 
investment were dealt with by assumption, as in the case of the Reddaway reports that in the 
absence of a British-owned plant in a market, the alternative was a foreign-owned plant of the 
same size in the same industry (Reddaway et al, 1967 and 1968).  That assumption essentially 
guaranteed a positive, or complementary relationship between a firm’s exports and its foreign 
production.  In the other direction, Bergsten, Horst, and Moran (1978) described the assumptions 
in Frank and Freeman (1975), and some in Hufbauer and Adler (1968), as assuming “…that 
foreign investment can only displace U.S. exports” (p. 98).  Their own analysis of questions 1a 
and 1b, based on U.S. aggregate data, cautiously summarized, pointed to mainly complementary 
relationships (pp. 93-96).  The studies by Lipsey and Weiss (1981) and (1984), the first of 
exports, by industry, to individual destinations, and second of total exports by individual U.S. 
firms, concluded that exports and production abroad by U.S. firms were, for the most part, 
complementary.  A study using a later U.S. census of direct investment abroad found more 
mixed results, mostly no relation, but where there was a significant relation, more frequently 
positive than negative (Blomström, Lipsey, and Kulchycky, 1988). 
  Two of the few studies based on access to the confidential individual firm data collected 
by the U.S. Department of Commerce were Brainard (1997) and Brainard and Riker (1997).  The 
focus of the Brainard and Riker study was on employment, rather than exports, but it is relevant   10
 
here because employment issues lie behind much of the interest in exports.  A feature of these 
studies, in contrast to many earlier ones of the United States and Sweden, is a more standard 
definition of complementarity and substitution, relating employment changes to wage changes in 
various locations.  The limitation of this definition of complementarity is that it excludes home 
country responses to variables other than the price of labor.   These might include income 
growth, trade restrictions, policies toward direct investment, or changes in non- labor costs of 
producing outside the home country.  Brainard and Riker concluded that while there is some 
competition between a manufacturing firm’s employment at home and that abroad, the degree of 
substitution is low.  Mostly, competition takes place among workers in affiliates in different 
developing countries, “…particularly in low value added industries” (p. 17).  Brainard (1997), 
testing the importance of factor price differences as an explanation for the location of foreign 
operations, dismisses it in favor of explanations based on the advantages of proximity to markets, 
among other factors.  She suggests that “the overall complementarity between trade and affiliate 
sales” is attributable to the fact that both “…are increasing in market size and intellectual 
property advantages…” (p. 539).  
  A study along similar lines for Swedish firms, based on individual firm data, (Braconier 
and Ekholm (2000) produced different results.  There was evidence of “…a substitutionary 
relationship between parent employment in Sweden and affiliate employment in other high- 
income locations…” but no “… evidence of a relationship  in either direction between parent 
firm employment and affiliate employment in low- income locations” (p. 459).  
Concerns in Sweden about home country effects of FDI led to a series of studies by 
Swedenborg (1973), (1979), (1982), (1985), and (2001), and by Swedenborg et al. (1988), 
examining this question, among others.  A important and innovative feature of Swedenborg   11
 
(1979) was the use of  2SLS to attempt to deal with the endogeneity of exports and the mutual 
determination with investment.  That procedure was carried into her later work as well.  The 
latest of her papers (Swedenborg, 2001), in addition, takes advantage of the longitudinal aspect 
of the Swedish data to examine the effects on firm exports of changes in a firm’s foreign 
production over time.  She concludes that “…the enormous growth of foreign production by 
Swedish firms in the thirty-year period, 1965-94 has not, in itself, had a negative effect on 
parent-company exports” (p. 121).  These studies examine parent company exports to individual 
countries as well as total parent exports.  Blomström, Lipsey, and Kulchycky (1988) used total 
Swedish exports and changes in them, rather than parent exports as the dependent variables, and 
found mainly positive relationships with production abroad and its growth, although there was 
one major industry, metal manufacturing, in which a negative relationship was evident (pp. 268-
269). 
As data on Japanese multinationals have become available for research in recent years, 
similar calculations have been carried out, with both parent exports (Lipsey, Ramstetter, and 
Blomström (1999) and Japanese industry exports (Lipsey, Ramstetter, and Blomström (2000a) as 
dependent variables.  In the minority of industries where any relationship between exports and 
overseas production can be discerned, the relation was positive, as in the United States and 
Sweden.  The relationships for the three countries are compared and summarized in Lipsey, 
Ramstetter, and Blomström (2000b). 
With the rise in unemployment levels in Europe and the increase in outward FDI by 
European firms, the possible connection between the two has become a popular subject for study 
in Europe.  In a study of bilateral trade and direct investment relationships for France, Fontagné 
and Pajot (2002) found complementarity between investment flows and net exports both for   12
 
countries as a whole and for individual industries, and concluded that much of the 
complementarity between countries came from spillovers among industries.  Studies by Chédor 
and Mucchielli(1998) and by Chédor,  Mucchielli, and Soubaya (2002), the latter based on panel 
data for individual French firms, and the former concerned with effects of developed countries’ 
direct investment in developing countries, both produced conclusions that investment and home- 
country exports were complementary.  
A recent survey of Australian firms’ investment overseas concluded that “…outward 
direct investment by Australian firms is mainly tapping into new growth and market 
opportunities for firms, rather than substituting for, or displacing, operations in Australia” 
(Australia, Productivity Commission, 2002, p. 24).  The questions about effects on employment 
and production in Australia both produced more than 70 per cent “no change” answers, but of 
those who reported changes increases were more common than decreases.  The question on 
effects on exports from Australia also yielded a majority of “no change,” but of those who 
reported an effect, the overwhelming majority reported an increase (ibid, p. 25). 
There have been many studies for other countries, mostly examining the relation of firms’ 
or industries’ foreign production to firm or industry exports.  While there are some examples of 
negative associations, they are not frequent, and positive associations are more common.  What 
is noticeable in a review of past studies, but is not commented on so often, is the frequency of 
results indicating no association in either direction.  The elements of gravity equations are 
consistently significant in the expected direction, while the influence of FDI production is spotty, 
varies among host countries, industries, and types of parent company exports.  Bergsten, Horst, 
and Moran (1978) refer to the relationship as “haphazard” (p. 97) and to “…the presence of 
complementary and substitutional relations” (p. 98).  Lipsey and Weiss (1984) found mostly   13
 
complementarity, but in half the industries there were no significant relationships at all.  
Blomström, Lipsey, and Kulchycky (1988) reported that “The predominant relationship between 
production in a country by affiliates of Swedish and U.S. firms and exports to that country from 
Sweden and the United States is something between neutrality and complementarity”  (p. 275).  
Swedenborg, in her latest paper, concludes that “…the net effect of foreign production is 
probably close to zero” (Swedenborg, 2001, p. 117). 
One way of interpreting these findings is that there are no universal relationships between 
production abroad by a firm or a country’s firms and exports by the investing firms, their 
industries, and the country as a whole.  There are circumstances in which foreign production 
tends to add to exports and circumstances in which it tends to reduce exports.  The effect may 
depend on whether the foreign operations’ relation to home operations is “horizontal” or 
“vertical,” a distinction stressed by Markusen and Maskus (2001).  It may also depend on 
whether the foreign operations are in goods industries or in service industries, are in developed 
or developing countries, or are in industries with plant level or firm level economies of scale. 
It seems plausible that horizontal FDI should tend to substitute for parent exports, at least 
in manufacturing, if not in services, and that vertical FDI might tend to add to parent exports.   
But there is not much evidence for this conjecture.  It is difficult to classify actual foreign 
operations into these theoretically neat categories.  A firm’s foreign operations usually include 
some activities similar to those of the parent, but the industry identifications in most data do not 
distinguish among segments of an industry.  The foreign operation may omit some parent 
activities, because they are performed for the affiliate by the parent.   And the foreign operation 
may include some activities that are not performed by the parent, because they are provided by 
the home country’s infrastructure or by a network of outside suppliers that does not exist in the   14
 
host country.  This distinction between horizontal and vertical FDI is more useful for thinking 
about multinational behavior or constructing models of it than for empirical research. 
A problem with most studies of effects of FDI on home country exports is that the terms, 
“substitution” and “complementarity” are not clearly defined.  That is partly because no policy 
measures are specified as determining the changes in investment or production.  It is rare to find 
a clear counterfactual to which the existing situation is being compared.  
The problem is illustrated by the example of a host-country tariff on imports that leads to 
both a reduction or cessation of imports and the establishment of host- country production owned 
by the former exporters.  Higher local production is accompanied by reduced exports, an 
apparent case of substitution.  The implied counterfactual is the original level of exports.  In fact, 
the alternative to the establishment or expansion of host- country production may have been no 
exports and no sales by the parent firm or its country.  That counterfactual would lead to the 
conclusion that the production and trade were either not related or were complementary, instead 
of the apparent substitution that appears in the data. 
A possible interpretation of these studies is that foreign production by a firm or industry 
has very little influence on exports from the parent firm or its home country.  Mainly, trade is 
determined by other factors, such as countries’ changing comparative advantages in production.  
Direct investment is mainly about the ownership of production, not its location.  What moves 
from country to country when a direct investment takes place is not primarily physical capital or 
production capacity, but rather intellectual capital, or techniques of production, unobserved and 
unmeasured.  There may be movements of physical or financial capital accompanying the 
intellectual capital, but there need not be, and they are not the essence of the investment. 
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b. FDI and Home Country Factor Demand 
  Even if direct investment did not affect the location of production and had no effect on a 
home country’s exports, it could influence home country factor demand and factor prices through 
changes in the allocation of types of production within the firm.  For example, multinationals 
based in rich countries might allocate their more labor-intensive production to their affiliates in 
poor countries, while concentrating their more capital-intensive or skill-intensive operations at 
home.  Large differences in capital intensity between U.S. (home) operations and affiliates in 
developing countries were noted in Lipsey, Kravis and Roldan (1982), but the response of capital 
intensity to labor costs was tested only among affiliates.  If multinationals tended to allocate their 
production in this way, their labor input per unit of home production should be lower than that of 
non-multinational firms.  Among multinational firms in an industry, larger affiliate output 
relative to parent output should be associated with lower labor intensity and higher skill intensity 
in home production.  In a study based on 1982 data, that relationship for labor intensity, 
measured by numbers of workers per unit of output, was found fairly consistently among 
industries in Kravis and Lipsey (1988), and less consistently for skill intensity, as measured by 
hourly wages.  A similar calculation based on 1988 data (Lipsey, 1995), found the same negative 
relation between affiliate net sales and parent employment, given the level of parent output.  
When affiliate activity was divided between manufacturing and non-manufacturing operations, it 
was the manufacturing operations that accounted for the negative relation to parent employment; 
higher net sales by non-manufacturing affiliates were associated with higher parent employment, 
given the level of parent output.  In a later study covering the United States and Sweden, 
Blomström, Fors, and Lipsey (1997) found that larger production in developing countries by a 
U.S. firm was associated with lower labor intensity at home.  In a further analysis of these data,   16
 
Lipsey (2002a) found that the effects on parent factor use across all types of countries were 
concentrated in the machinery and transport equipment industries.  There were positive effects 
on parent employment per unit of output in the machinery sectors and negative effects in 
Transport Equipment.   
 Swedish firms tended to use more labor per unit of output at home if they produced more 
abroad.  That might be because production abroad required supervisory and other auxiliary 
employment at home.  Or it might be that only the existence of foreign production enabled firms 
in a small market such as Sweden to develop and support extensive headquarters and research 
services.  One explanation offered for the difference between Swedish and U.S. firms was that 
the Swedish investments in developing countries were concentrated in import substitution 
activities, and the affiliates exported little of their output, much less than U.S. affiliates.  The 
Swedish affiliates could not, therefore, be woven into a worldwide division of labor that took 
account of factor price differences. 
  A later paper added Japanese firms to these comparisons (Lipsey, Ramstetter, and 
Blomström, 2000b).   As in Swedish firms, higher levels of foreign output, given the level of 
home output, led to higher employment at home per unit of home output, presumably for 
supervision.  It was suggested that Japanese firms could not easily shed redundant home-country 
workers even if they had wished to do so. 
  No explicit home country production functions were fitted in these studies.  Therefore, 
the variable for affiliate output incorporated the influence of any home country firm 
characteristics that were associated with the size of affiliate production.   Furthermore, most of 
these results are from cross-sections.  A different approach is taken by Slaughter (2000), 
examining what he refers to as “MNE transfer,” the shift, in percentage terms, of activities from   17
 
parents to their foreign affiliates.  He asks whether such “transfer” causes “skill upgrading,” 
increases in the share of non-production worker wages in industry total wage bills, in the 
corresponding domestic U.S. industries.  
  Slaughter fits translog cost functions to data on the share of non-production worker 
wages in the total wage bills of 32 U.S. manufacturing industries, taking account of relative wage 
rates for production and non-production workers, capital/labor ratios, and output.  Various 
measures of MNE transfer are added to these equations.  All the transfer measures are based on 
ratios of affiliate activity in U.S. MNEs to total activity in the United States in the industries of 
the affiliates.  The expectation of an effect on total industry skill levels is based on the fact that 
the parents of the affiliates account for most of their respective industries. 
  While higher investment in plant and equipment and higher industry output both led to 
skill upgrading, increases in affiliate activity in host countries had no significant impact.  
Slaughter concludes that his finding “…is inconsistent with models of MNEs in which affiliate 
activities substitute for parent unskilled- labor- intensive activities” (p. 467).  That conclusion is 
reached despite the fact that there are no data for parent, rather than industry, skill levels, and 
that the MNE transfer measure is not specific to transfers to low- wage countries. 
  A different conclusion is reached by Head and Ries (2002) for the foreign operations of 
Japanese firms.  Their calculations on an industry basis, similar to those of Slaughter (2000) for 
the United States, match his findings.   The ratio of affiliate employment to the total of home and 
affiliate employment in an industry does not significantly affect the share of non- production 
worker wages in the total wage bill in the home country.  However, once they move to a firm-
level analysis, they do find that a higher affiliate employment share in the multinational firm 
produces a higher non-production worker wage share in the parent firm.  That positive effect is   18
 
associated with affiliate employment in low-wage countries; more employment in the United 
States appears to have the opposite effect.  Thus, overseas production in low-wage countries 
seems to raise the parent firm’s demand for skilled workers at home relative to the demand for 
unskilled workers. 
  The contrast between industry and firm-level results suggests the possibility that 
substitution among types of activities may take place not only between home and foreign 
operations of a firm, but also between parent firms and non-multinational firms in the same 
industry at home.  That is a subject that has received very little attention, but deserves 
investigation. 
 
c.  Home Country Exports and Home Country Multinationals’ Exports 
The idea that firms have comparative advantages separate from those of their home 
countries has been illustrated by several episodes.  One is the contrast between the export shares 
of the United States and of US-based multinational firms.  During the period from 1966 to 1987, 
the US share of world exports of manufactured goods fell from 17 per cent to about 11 per cent, 
a decline of a third.  Over that same period, US- based multinational firms’ share of these 
exports, from the parent companies and their overseas affiliates, was quite stable, ranging from 
15&1/2 per cent to 18 percent, but ending up in 1987 about where it began in 1966.  The way 
this stability was achieved was that, as the world share of exports by the parent firms fell from 11 
to 7&1/2 per cent, the share of the overseas affiliates of these companies, exporting from their 
host countries, grew from under 5 to over 8 per cent.  The US multinationals retained their shares 
of world exports, while the United States as a country was losing a large part of its share, 
because the multinationals’ share depended on their firm-specific advantages, and the   19
 
multinationals could exploit their firm-specific advantages by producing in other countries 
(Lipsey, 1995, pp. 12-13). 
The divergence between home countries and home country firms was not confined to the 
United States.  For example, as Japanese export shares fell after the currency revaluations in 
1985, Japanese affiliate export shares increased enough to approximately offset the decline in the 
country’s share.  Swedish shares in world manufactured exports fell by almost a third between 
1965 and 1990, but Swedish multinationals’ shares of world exports remained stable, or even 
increased a little (ibid., pp. 14-15). 
For all these countries’ multinationals, foreign production was apparently not only a way 
of exploiting their firm-specific assets in foreign markets, but also a way of protecting these 
market shares against unfavorable home country developments.  These might be exchange rate 
appreciations, increases in home country wage levels, increases in taxes, or other changes that 
reduced the geographical advantages of their home countries as locations for production. 
 
IV. Host Country Effects of Inward FDI 
a.  Host Country Wages 
There are several ways in which the entrance or existence of foreign firms might affect 
wages in the host countries where they operate.  One is if these firms offer higher wages than are 
paid by domestic firms. That possibility raises the question, dealt with in subsection 1, of 
whether they do pay higher wages.  Even if they did pay higher wages, there might be no overall 
impact on wage levels if the higher wages simply reflected the selection by foreign firms among 
workers, plants, or locations.  They might select superior workers who would command high 
wages from any employer, or acquire higher wage plants or firms, or concentrate their activities   20
 
in high-wage industries or regions of a country.  Thus, the second question, discussed in 
subsection 2, is whether the payment of higher wages by foreign- owned firms, when it occurs, 
results in higher wages in domestically- owned firms, or “wage spillovers.”  The third question, 
discussed in subsection 3, which I think is the most important from a policy point of view, is 
whether the activities of foreign- owned firms cause wages in general to be higher, on average, 
where they operate.  That could be the result of the combination of higher wages in the foreign- 
owned plants and wage spillovers to domestically- owned plants, but it could result from higher 
wages paid by foreign- owned firms even if there were no wage spillovers, or negative 
spillovers, to domestically- owned plants.  It could also occur without any wage differential 
between foreign – owned and domestically- owned operations if labor markets were sufficiently 
competitive and the rise in demand for labor from foreign- owned operations forced all firms to 
raise their wage levels equally. 
The measurement of wage levels is in some ways simpler than the measurement of 
productivity levels, taken up in Section b.  It has its own problems, however.  Most of the data 
are calculated as compensation/number of workers.  Very few take account of hours of work, 
probably most important outside manufacturing, but a possible source of mismeasurement in all 
industries.  Probably more important is that there are few sources of data that contain information 
on the characteristics of workers, so that is impossible in most cases to distinguish between 
differences in wage rates for identical workers and differences in labor quality. 
 
 1.  Wage comparisons 
It is rare to find a study of FDI and wages in any host country that does not find that 
foreign-owned firms pay higher wages, on average, than at least privately-owned local firms.    21
 
That is the case not only in developing countries, where most of the research has taken place, but 
also in developed, high-wage countries.  To some extent, the differential can be explained by the 
industry composition of FDI, weighted toward relatively high-wage industry sectors.  However, 
the differential exists within industries, in most industries, and in most countries. 
There are two broad types of questions that can be asked about this phenomenon.  One is 
about how labor markets operate in these host countries, particularly whether foreign firms pay 
higher prices for labor, in the sense of paying higher wages for workers of the same quality.  The 
other is about how inward foreign direct investment affects labor markets, whether or not the 
effects can be accounted for by firm size, industry, capital intensity, R&D intensity, or other 
characteristics associated with foreign firms, that could belong to domestic firms as well as to 
foreign firms. 
Why would a foreign-owned firm pay a higher price than a domestic firm for labor of a 
given quality?   It presumably could pay more than a domestically- owned firm of the same size 
if its superior technology produced higher marginal labor productivity, but the expected response 
would be to expand output rather than to raise wages.  Several reasons have been suggested.  
One is that it may be forced to do so by host-country regulations or home-country pressures.  The 
Findlay model assumes that foreign firms pay a higher wage for labor of the same quality  “…for 
purposes of good public relations” (1978, p. 9). It might be that workers prefer locally- owned 
firms, and must be compensated to overcome this preference.  A third possibility is that foreign-
owned firms pay a premium to reduce worker turnover, because they have brought some 
proprietary technology and wish to reduce the speed with which it leaks out to domestic rivals as 
employees change jobs.  A fourth is that foreign firms, because of their limited understanding of   22
 
local labor markets, pay higher wages to attract better workers, while more knowledgable local 
firms can identify and attract better workers without paying them higher wages.  
Studies attempting to measure the pure effect of foreignness are akin to successive 
distillations to remove impurities.  The impurities in this case are explanations for differentials 
that are not necessarily intrinsic to foreignness, although they may be associated with it in 
practice. What may be more relevant to judging the optimum policies toward inward direct 
investment are studies with not quite as many controls.  A state or a region or a country that 
wishes to estimate the effect of allowing inward FDI where it had been prohibited, or reducing 
obstacles to it, may not care why the foreign firm will pay higher wages.  It is not relevant 
whether it is because the firm is foreign, or because it is large, because it brings more capital- 
intensive or skill- intensive production methods, or better access to world markets.  A domestic 
firm with the same attributes might have the same impact, but there may not be any such 
domestic firm, or if there is one, it may not be willing to make this particular investment. 
  If foreign firms are found to pay higher wages than local firms, for whatever reason, there 
are still several questions to be asked about the impact.  If foreign firms hired high-wage workers 
away from local firms, or acquired local firms with skilled labor forces, we might find that 
foreign ownership was associated with higher wages in the foreign-owned firms and lower 
wages in domestic firms, but no difference in average industry wage levels.  If foreign firms paid 
more, but did not differentially poach the best workers from local firms, one should find a larger 
presence of foreign ownership associated with higher wages in the industry, but not in locally-
owned firms in the industry.  Or finally, we might find examples of “spillover”, where higher 
foreign presence was associated with higher wages in domestically- owned establishments.   23
 
  Data on wage differences come in several different forms.  Some are simple comparisons 
of average wages, or average wages by industry, where wage differences reflect any effects of 
firm or plant characteristics, such as size or capital intensity, and of worker characteristics, such 
as age and education.  Others adjust for differences in plant characteristics, asking whether 
foreign- owned plants pay wages different from those in otherwise identical domestically- owned 
plants.  A third type, less common, adjusts for differences in worker characteristics, asking 
whether foreign- owned plants pay different wages from those in domestically- owned plants for 
identical workers.  And a fourth type, still more rare, adjusts for both plant and worker 
characteristics, asking whether foreign- owned plants pay different wages from those in identical 
domestically- owned plants for identical workers. 
  Observations of higher wages in foreign-owned firms in developing countries go back a 
long time, although the earliest ones were not the result of careful statistical studies.  One of 
these was an early study of American firms in Colombia.  It concluded that “… Colombian labor, 
whenever it is paid a stipulated wage, is better remunerated and granted more sanitary living 
quarters by foreigners than by natives, but the foreigners probably exact more systematic and 
strenuous effort” (Rippy, 1931,p. 190).  Another partial explanation for the higher wages was 
that “…the American companies are eager to attract the most efficient labor…” (ibid, p. 191). 
  A study by Blomström (1983) of Mexican manufacturing industries in 1970 found that 
foreign-owned firms paid wages about 25, per cent above those in domestically- owned firms in 
manufacturing as a whole.  Foreign firm wage levels were also higher in each of four major 
groups of manufacturing industries, by 25 to 30 per cent, except in capital goods industries, 
where the difference was much smaller (pp. 18-19).   24
 
  Many of the recent studies of wages in foreign plants in developing countries have been 
based on manufacturing sector data on individual establishments collected in national surveys 
and assembled by the World Bank.  A number of them were carried out by Ann Harrison, in 
collaboration with several others, and wage data for three of these studies are summarized in 
Harrison (1996).   
There were statistically significant differences between wages in foreign- owned and 
domestically- owned plants in 3 out of 12 industries in Côte d’Ivoire, 12 out of 18 in Morocco, 
and 8 out of 9 in Venezuela.  Ratios of foreign/domestic plant wages, where the differences were 
significant, ranged from 1.1 to 1.9 in Côte d’Ivoire, 1.3 to 2.6 in Morocco, and 1.2 to 2.0 in 
Venezuela.  These are simple differences without adjustment for plant or worker characteristics.  
One problem with cross-sectional analyses of wage differences is the unknown role of 
unmeasured aspects of plant heterogeneity.  For Venezuela, that problem could be dealt with by 
examining wages in individual plants over time.  While the relationship between wages and 
foreign ownership of a plant was weaker, and the differential smaller than in aggregated data, 
foreign ownership of a plant, controlling for plant size, industry, and capital intensity, resulted in 
higher wages by 16-18 per cent (Aitken, Harrison, and Lipsey, 1996, p. 368). 
  A paper on Morocco by Haddad and Harrison (1993) found that wages were 70 per cent 
higher, on average, in foreign firms (p. 58).  The difference partly reflected the greater size of the 
foreign- owned firms; in weighted means, calculated to eliminate the size effect, the difference 
was reduced to 30 per cent.  The weighted average mean real wages were significantly higher in 
foreign- owned firms in 16 out of 18 individual industries.  All the industries in which the wage 
differences were statistically significant showed higher wages in the foreign- owned plants.     25
 
  Something of an oddity, which casts some suspicion on the productivity measures, is 
that these higher wages in foreign- owned plants were accompanied by lower output per worker, 
at least in the weighted averages, and lower total factor productivity. 
   Several studies of Indonesia, such as Hill (1990) and Manning (1998) found that foreign 
firms paid higher wages than domestic firms. A recent paper using establishment data for 
Indonesia, (Lipsey and Sjöholm, 2001), found that in 1996, foreign- owned firms paid about 50 
per cent higher wages than private domestically- owned firms in manufacturing as a whole, for 
both blue collar and white collar workers.  When account was taken of the education levels of the 
workers, and of the industry and location of plants, foreign ownership was associated with wages 
about 25 per cent higher for blue-collar workers and 50 per cent higher for white- collar workers.  
Much of the differential was associated with the larger size of foreign- owned plants and greater 
inputs of energy and other intermediate product.  The authors concluded that there was strong 
evidence that foreign firms “…paid a higher price for labor than domestically-owned plants.” 
(p.13).  They paid a higher price, by a large margin, for workers of a given educational level 
(something most studies do not have information on, because business censuses rarely include 
labor force characteristics).  Even with the effects of all these plant characteristics removed, and 
education as well, blue collar workers in foreign- owned plants earned about 12 per cent more 
than in domestic plants and white collar workers about 20 per cent more (ibid).  
  In four East Asian countries for which Ramstetter (1999, Table 2) reported wages in 
foreign and domestic plants or firms, averaged over 14-23 year periods, wages were higher in the 
foreign- owned ones, although in Singapore and Taiwan, the differences were not significant. 
  Similar questions can be asked about wages in foreign- owned plants in developed 
countries.  The increasing availability of individual firm and establishment microdata sets has   26
 
encouraged such studies.  In the United States, the linking of Economic Census establishment 
data with BEA surveys of inward foreign direct investment was a catalyst.  Using the BEA-
Census data for 1987, the first such match, Lipsey (1994) found that workers in foreign-owned 
establishments earned 10 –12 per cent more than those in domestically- owned establishments in 
the same 2-digit SIC industries and states.  They earned 6-7 percent more in manufacturing and 
12-15 per cent more in other industries.  Howenstine and Zeile (1994), using access to more 
detailed information by industry and location not available outside the Department of 
Commerce, found similar differentials in manufacturing, all of which they could explain by 
differences in establishment size.  Using individual manufacturing plant data, Doms and Jensen 
(1998) found that even controlling for 4-digit industry, state, plant size, and plant age, foreign- 
owned plants paid higher wages.  They attributed the higher wage in foreign plants to the fact 
that they were parts of multinational firms, a theory they felt was confirmed by the fact that the 
highest wages of all were paid by domestic plants that were parts of U.S. multinational firms.  
One question about this comparison is whether foreign subsidiaries in the United States were 
comparable to the establishments of U.S. multinationals, since the latter could include firm 
headquarters operations, a high-paid category probably not part of the U.S. operations of foreign 
multinationals.  
  A recent paper used both the 1987 and 1992 Census-BEA matches for establishments, 
combined into state by detailed industry cells for foreign- owned and domestically- owned 
establishments (Feliciano and Lipsey, 1999).  It was unusual in that it covered the whole 
economy, rather than only manufacturing.    Foreign- owned establishments in the United States 
paid higher wages than domestically- owned ones in all industries taken together, by 23 per cent 
in 1987 and 15 per cent in 1992 (Table 2).  Once average establishment size, education levels in   27
 
the state and industry, state unionization levels, and per cent female in the state labor force were 
accounted for, and industry dummies were included, there was no significant difference in 
manufacturing.  However, foreign- owned establishments paid higher wages in non- 
manufacturing, by 8&1/2 to 9&1/2 percent (Tables 3A and 3B).   
  While the United States has been the subject of the largest number of studies, there have 
been some for other developed countries as well.  An early study of American direct investment 
in Australia (Brash, 1966) concluded, from a survey, that “…it… appears beyond a doubt that 
even within each industry American-affiliated firms on average pay higher total incomes to their 
employees than do firms without American connections” (p. 129).  Globerman, Ries, and 
Vertinsky (1994) reported higher wages in foreign- owned plants in Canada.   
  In recent years, establishment microdata have become available for the United Kingdom, 
and these have been used for wage and other comparisons.  Griffith and Simpson (2001) report 
that foreign- owned establishments in the United Kingdom paid higher wages than domestically- 
owned establishments for both operatives and administrative and technical employees, in both 
1980 and 1995.  The margin was larger for the lower-skill employees, and widened considerably 
over the period.   An earlier published paper (Griffith, 1999) compared wages in foreign- owned 
plants of companies based in France, Germany, Japan, and the United States with those in 
domestically- owned plants.  It found no significant differences for 1980, except in U.S.- owned 
plants, but higher wages in foreign- owned plants in 1992, by margins ranging from 8 to 25 per 
cent (p. 428).  In the Motor Vehicle and Engines Industry, examined in more detail in the article, 
there were only small margins for operatives, 2 to 4 per cent, but foreign- owned plants paid 
around 25 per cent more to administrative, technical, and clerical workers (p. 431).   28
 
A set of “survivors”, establishments present in the UK Annual Census of Production, or 
ARD, throughout the period 1973-1993, was assembled by Oulton (2001).  He reports that 
foreign- owned establishments paid average wages for operatives that were above the average for 
UK- owned establishments by 17 per cent for non- US establishments and 26 per cent for US- 
owned establishments.  The margins for Administrative, Technical, and Clerical (ATC) 
employees were 12 and 24 per cent.   The plants differed in other respects as well: foreign- 
owned plants, and especially US- owned plants, were characterized by higher capital per worker, 
much higher intermediate input per worker, and higher proportions of ATC employees (p. 129).  
Although there is no evidence on worker quality, Oulton attributes the wage differential to higher 
human capital per worker in the foreign plants, because “…companies do not pay higher wages 
out of the goodness of their hearts….” (p. 130).  A set of regressions including industry dummy 
variables indicates that industry composition accounts for little of the differential.  Within 
industries, US- owned establishments paid 14 to 15 per cent more than domestic establishments 
and other foreign establishments paid 10 per cent more to operatives and 8 per cent more to ATC 
workers (p. 132). 
Using a large sample of UK firms from 1991 to 1996 Girma et al. (2001) reported an 
overall wage differential of 14 per cent in favor of workers in foreign- owned firms, and a 
differential of almost 10 per cent when industry and scale of operations are taken into account.  
In addition, wage growth was higher by 0.4 per cent per year in the foreign- owned firms (Tables 
1 and 2).  They summarized their reading of earlier literature as showing “…considerable 
evidence to support a wage differential in favour of foreign owned firms” (p. 121).   29
 
Driffield and Girma (2002) reported that foreign- owned establishments in the UK 
electronics industry in 1980 to 1992 paid wages higher by 7.6 and 6.0 per cent for skilled and 
unskilled workers respectively, and also employed a higher proportion of skilled workers (p. 14). 
   Since there is always a problem of the effect of unknown firm characteristics on these 
comparisons, a tempting solution is to observe firms that are acquired by foreign owners.  That 
solution is rare because of the lack of accessible data, but Conyon, Girma, Thompson, and 
Wright (1999) were able to construct panels of firms in the United Kingdom taken over by 
domestic and foreign acquirers and matching data for over 600 firms that did not change 
ownership.  At the time of acquisition, the firms acquired by foreigners paid wages about the 
same as those of firms acquired by domestic owners.  However, in the first, second, and third 
years after acquisition, firms acquired by foreigners raised their wages faster than did firms 
acquired by domestic owners (Table 5).  Controlling for fixed firm and industry effects and 
aggregate time shocks, the authors found that wages rose by 3.4 per cent in firms acquired by 
foreigners and fell by 2.1 per cent in firms acquired by domestic owners.  Controlling also for 
firm size and industry wages hardly changes the results.  Adding productivity change as a control 
variable eliminated the differential in favor of foreign firms (p. 9 and Table 6), but if one is 
interested in measuring wage differentials, rather than explaining them, productivity change is 
not an appropriate control. 
The evidence seems to me overwhelming that foreign- owned firms in all kinds of 
economies pay higher wages than domestically- owned firms.  It is harder to say whether they 
also pay a higher price for labor; that is a higher wage for workers of a given quality, although 
one of the few studies that incorporates quality measures finds that they do.  Much of the 
differential, all of it in some studies, can be associated with the larger size of the foreign-owned   30
 
operations.  However, higher capital intensity and higher inputs of intermediate products, leading 
to higher productivity, are also important.  If regions or countries encouraging inward investment 
are interested in encouraging high-wage plants, foreign investors seem to meet that desire. 
 
  2. Wage spillovers 
  Whether or not foreign- owned firms in a country pay higher wages than domestic firms,  
their presence might still affect the level of wages in domestically- owned plants.  Such effects 
are referred to as wage spillovers to domestically- owned plants.  They would not take place in 
the world envisioned in the Findlay (1978) model.  There, “The economy is considered able to 
draw on a reservoir of labor in a ‘peasant hinterland’ as in the famous model of Arthur Lewis 
(1954) and also on a substantial ‘industrial reserve army’ of urban unemployed” (p.8).  However, 
domestic firm wage effects from inward investment could take place in any world where the 
supply curve for labor was not horizontal. 
  Calculations of wage spillovers in two developing countries, Mexico and Venezuela, are 
included in Aitken, Harrison, and Lipsey (1996).  Impacts of shares of employment in foreign-
owned plants in an industry and region on wages in domestically- owned establishments were 
measured.  In Mexico, wages in domestically- owned plants appeared to be lower where foreign 
ownership was high, but the coefficients were not statistically significant.  However, in 
Venezuela, there seemed to be a significant negative influence of foreign presence on wages in 
domestically- owned plants.  To some extent, this result could reflect a reallocation of the labor 
force to foreign plants, through the “poaching” of better workers or the acquisition of higher- 
paying plants by foreigners.  However, if this had been the whole story, there would not have 
been a positive effect of higher foreign ownership on total industry wages.   31
 
  Lipsey and Sjöholm (2001) made a variety of calculations of spillovers from foreign 
presence to wages in domestically- owned establishments in Indonesia, calculating foreign 
presence at various levels of industry and geographical detail.  In every variant, there were 
significant spillovers to domestically- owned establishments.  The coefficients on foreign shares 
in wage equations were larger than the observed wage differentials, suggesting some impact 
through increases in the demand for labor.  The coefficients were generally higher for white-
collar than for blue-collar workers (pp. 26-27). 
  In their study of South Carolina counties described below, Figlio and Blonigen (2000) did 
not have the data needed for testing for spillovers from inward investment.  However, they 
concluded that the effect of the investment on aggregate wage levels was so large that it could 
not have been confined to the foreign plants themselves, and must have involved some spillovers 
to domestically- owned plants (p. 352, f.n. 12). 
In Feliciano and Lipsey (1999), the existence of two years of data permitted the authors 
to examine the effects of changes in the extent of foreign ownership in a state by industry cell on 
wages in domestically- owned establishments.  In manufacturing, there were no significant 
effects (Table 4a).  In non-manufacturing industries, there were large and statistically significant 
effects on domestic firm wages, although the significance became marginal when state by 
industry education levels were added.  
Girma et al. (2001) test for wage spillovers to domestic firms in their UK company data 
set for 1991-96 and find no overall spillover effect on wage levels and a small negative effect on 
wage growth (p. 128).  The only firm characteristic that appears to influence the extent of wage 
spillovers is the gap in productivity between the firm and the firm in the industry at the 90
th 
percentile in productivity.  The larger the productivity gap, the smaller the wage spillover.  The   32
 
only industry characteristic that affects wage spillovers is the degree of import penetration.  The 
higher it is, the larger the wage spillover. 
  Some of the literature on wage spillovers from foreign-owned to domestically- owned 
firms has recently been reviewed by Görg and Greenaway (2001).  They summarize the results 
of panel data studies as showing mostly negative spillovers and cross-section studies as showing 
positive spillovers.  There is no overlap in the countries studied, but the authors are skeptical 
about all findings from cross-section studies on the ground that they cannot take account of 
unknown firm characteristics.  My own judgment is that there are enough indications of positive 
wage spillovers, even in panel data studies, to preclude any conclusion that they are typically 
negative.  What is needed most is more consideration of the different circumstances and policies 
of countries, industries, and firms that promote or obstruct spillovers. 
 
  3. Effects on average wages 
  Whether or not wages are higher in foreign- owned plants than in domestically- owned 
plants, and whether or not, where there are higher wages, they spill over to domestically- owned 
plants, a higher degree of foreign ownership could affect the average level of wages in a country 
or industry.  It might do so either by raising the demand for labor or through the higher wages 
paid by the foreign plants themselves. 
  Aitken, Harrison, and Lipsey report (1996, p. 352) that even though there were no 
spillovers or negative spillovers, to domestically- owned plants in Mexico and Venezuela, there 
was a significant effect of foreign ownership shares in raising average industry wages.   The 
effect was larger for skilled workers than for unskilled, and larger in Venezuela than in Mexico.   33
 
  Feenstra and Hanson (1997), defining skilled workers simply as non-production workers, 
found that a higher level of maquiladora activity in a Mexican industry within a state led to a 
higher share of total wages going to skilled workers.  They interpreted this increase in the non-
production wage share as implying a rise in the demand for skilled labor relative to unskilled 
labor resulting from the growth in maquiladora production by foreign, mainly U.S. firms.   The 
increase in the wage share of non-production workers could be a combination of relative wage 
increases for them or relative increases in their numbers.  However, there is some evidence of 
particularly large relative wage growth for non-production workers in the border region, where 
most of the maquiladoras are located, in the periods after investment rules were liberalized.  
  The effect of changes in foreign ownership from 1987 to 1992 on average wages in state 
by industry cells in the United States were found to be insignificant in manufacturing by 
Feliciano and Lipsey (1999, Tables 5a and 5b).  However, outside of the manufacturing sector,  
increases in foreign ownership were associated with increases in average wages.  
  One avenue of relative wage increases that might be associated with increases in foreign 
ownership is skill upgrading, shifting the demand for labor in an industry toward higher skill.  
Blonigen and Slaughter (2001), measuring skill upgrading by the share of skilled wages in the 
total wage bill, find no evidence of such an effect from increases in foreign presence in U.S. 
manufacturing industries, a result that matches Feliciano and Lipsey (1999).  They find some 
negative effect from Japanese investment in U.S. manufacturing, but other studies have shown 
that Japanese investments are not typical.    
  In a more local study, Figlio and Blonigen (2000) reported that, in South Carolina, the 
addition of foreign- owned manufacturing plants was associated with increases in real wages for   34
 
all workers in the same industry and county.  The gain was much larger than that from the 
addition of new domestically- owned plants. 
  I would summarize the sparse evidence on overall wage levels as pointing to positive 
effects of FDI activity.  When there are no spillovers, the effect might be wholly from the higher 
wages offered by the foreign firms, or it might reflect the impact of foreign firms on the 
aggregate demand for labor.  When there are positive spillovers, they add to the impact of the 
foreign firms.  Even when there are negative spillovers, they do not seem to be large enough to 
offset the positive effect of the foreign firms’ high wages or the effects of increased demand for 
labor. 
 
b.  Host Country Productivity 
The issues that arise with respect to measuring effects on wages in host countries are also 
involved in judging effects on productivity.  The benefits to the host countries, if they exist, stem 
mainly from the superior efficiency of the foreign- owned operations.  The first question, then, is 
whether foreign- owned firms or establishments are more efficient.  If they are, the second 
question is whether their superior productivity spills over to locally- owned firms in their 
industries, or their industries within their regions, or related industries.  Locally- owned firms 
might increase their efficiency by copying the operations of the foreign- owned firms, or be 
forced by competition from foreign- owned firms to raise their efficiency to survive.  On the 
negative side, it is conceivable that foreign- owned operations are more efficient only because 
foreigners have taken over the more efficient local firms, leaving the less efficient in local 
ownership.  Or by taking markets from local firms, foreign- owned firms might force the locally- 
owned firms into less efficient scales of production.  The third, and broadest question is whether   35
 
as a result of the operations of foreign- owned firms, there are improvements in aggregate 
industry efficiency.  Those could arise from spillovers, but they could come simply from the 
higher efficiency of foreign firms, even if the higher efficiency is confined to the foreign firms.  
There could also be increases in aggregate productivity without any visible productivity 
differentials between foreign- owned and domestically- owned firms, if the industry were 
sufficiently competitive that the entry of foreign- owned firms forced their domestically- owned 
competitors to match them quickly to survive.  These possibilities point to the importance of 
examining not only firms that remain in an industry over the period of observation, but also firms 
that enter or exit, because they may account for many of the changes in productivity for an 
industry or country. 
For any of these questions, efficiency must be defined.  The choices range from value 
added per unit of labor input, the simplest, to value added per unit of labor and capital input and 
value of output per unit of labor, capital, and intermediate product input.  Some studies fit 
production functions that also incorporate scale economies.  Most authors seem to prefer the 
efficiency measures including capital input.  The result is to ignore any host country benefit from 
the acquisition of physical capital, or from any advance in technology that consists of the 
adoption of more capital intensive methods of production or larger scale production. 
Most theoretical discussions of the possible role of inward investment refer to the 
transmission of superior technology.  The examination of productivity is an attempt to measure 
technology gaps and changes in technology.  That is a narrow view of multinationals’ technology 
advantages, which may consist more of their knowledge of world markets or methods of 
coordinating production over many countries.  Almost all the measurement is confined to 
manufacturing, a large part of multinational activity, but far from the whole of it.   36
 
Many of the problems in studying productivity involve the measurement of capital input.  
Most sources of establishment data either do not report capital stocks, or report nominal values.  
These are likely to bear a small resemblance to market values, especially in countries that have 
undergone major inflation.  Where even nominal capital values are missing, they are often 
calculated from past expenditures using the perpetual inventory method.  Such calculations, if 
done properly, should be based not on general deflators but on capital goods price indexes, 
scarce and subject to serious doubts even in the best of statistical systems.  The complications do 
not mean that the calculations should not be carried out, but they suggest caution in drawing 
conclusions and the advisability of comparing total factor productivity measures with labor 
productivity and wages to see whether the relations among them are logical. 
1. Productivity comparisons 
Comparisons of productivity between foreign- owned and domestically- owned firms 
have been far more common than comparisons of wage levels.  Much of the productivity 
literature has been directed at the question of whether there were spillovers to domestic firms, 
but that question itself implies the expectation that foreign firms are more efficient, and thus that 
there is some productivity advantage that might spill over to domestic firms.  The comparisons 
themselves range from simple overall productivity comparisons to attempts to explain 
differences between foreign and domestic firms.  The explanatory variables, aside from 
nationality of ownership, include capital intensity, skill intensity, and the scale of operations.  
These comparisons ask, in effect, whether foreign firms that differ from domestic firms differ 
because they operate on different production functions or because they operate at different points 
on the same functions.    37
 
Most of the productivity comparisons have been for the manufacturing sectors in 
developing countries.  Blomström and Wolff (1994), examining Mexican manufacturing data for 
1970, found both value added and gross output per employee to have been more than twice as 
high in MNC- owned plants overall as in private domestic plants, and higher in each of 20 
individual manufacturing industries (p. 266).  Capital intensities in MNC plants were also much 
higher, and  as a result, the TFP margins were smaller.  They were about a third overall, and 
three industries showed higher TFP in the domestic plants (pp. 267 and 268).  Sjöholm (1999) 
examined Indonesian establishment data for 1980 and 1991, calculating differences in 
“technology” between foreign- owned and domestically- owned establishments.  Technology 
differences were measured as the coefficients on foreign ownership dummies in equations 
relating value added per worker in 1980 and 1991 to scale, 1980 investment expenditure per 
worker, as a proxy for capital intensity, and dummy variables for 1991 observations and foreign 
ownership.  The estimated technology differences were found to be in favor of the foreign – 
owned establishments in 26 out of 28 industries.  Kokko, Zejan, and Tansini (2001) reported that 
in Uruguay, in 1988, productivity, as measured by value added per worker, was about twice as 
high on average in foreign firms as in domestic firms. Haddad and Harrison (1993) found, for 
Morocco, in 1985-89, that output per worker was higher, and deviations from best-practice 
frontiers were smaller, in foreign-owned firms than in domestically-owned firms in 12 out of 18 
industries, and in all eight of the industries in which the differences were statistically significant.  
Okamoto and Sjöholm (1999), examining Indonesian manufacturing microdata from 
1990 to 1995 reported higher foreign shares of gross output than of employment in almost every 
industry.  An implication of this finding is that labor productivity was higher in the foreign- 
owned plants.    38
 
Kathuria (2000) studied Indian firms in 26 manufacturing industries over the 14 years 
from 1975-76 to 1988-89, in a “pre-liberalization period when Indian industry was highly 
regulated in terms of industrial and technology policy” (p. 346).  The main productivity 
measurement used was distance from its industry technological frontier, for a firm rather than an 
establishment.  In 13 of the 26 industries, a foreign firm was the technological leader, and in 15 
industries, foreign firms were, on average, more efficient.  In two of the industries, the reported 
efficiency of the foreign firms was so low as to arouse a reader’s suspicions about the data, but 
no comment was made by the author.  Another unusual feature of the data is that because 
employment is not reported, it is estimated from compensation, assuming that local and foreign 
firms pay the same wages.  That assumption, if we can judge from the wage studies, almost 
certainly overstates employment in foreign firms and understates their productivity.   
Chuang and Lin (1999) report that among a random sample of manufacturing firms in 
Taiwan in 1991, foreign- owned firms had considerably higher labor productivity than 
domestically- owned firms, but only very slightly higher total factor productivity.  The foreign- 
owned firms were much larger and much more capital- intensive. 
Comparing foreign- owned with domestically- owned firms or plants in five East Asian 
countries over 15-20 year periods, Ramstetter (1999) reported that value added per employee 
was higher in the foreign- owned plants in all the countries.  However, Malaysian data confined 
to large firms showed higher productivity in the local firms in the later part of the period. 
Foreign- owned Turkish plants in 1993-1995 had higher productivity than domestically- 
owned plants even when various elements of the production function are taken account of 
(Erdilek, 2002).  That higher level of productivity persisted through a variety of statistical tests 
of the regressions.   39
 
There have been fewer examinations of the productivity of foreign- owned and 
domestically- owned firms within developed countries, despite their large share of direct 
investment.   Notable studies of the United States include Howenstine and Zeile (1994), and 
Doms and Jensen (1998), mentioned earlier.   Howenstine and Zeile, using the combined BEA 
and Census establishment data for manufacturing, found foreign- owned plants to have higher 
labor productivity than domestically- owned ones.  They attributed the difference largely to 
“…the tendency for foreign- owned establishments to be concentrated in industries in which 
productivity is high…” and the within- industry differences to “…plant size, capital intensity, 
and employee skill level—rather than foreign ownership per se.”  Doms and Jensen concluded 
that foreign- owned plants were superior to U.S.- owned plants of non- multinational firms, even 
large firms, in both labor productivity and TFP, but that they were behind plants owned by U.S. 
multinationals.  Thus they find multinationality of the firm to be strongly associated with 
productivity levels, beyond the association with size and other plant characteristics.  A similar 
hierarchy characterized the ranking with respect to the “number of technologies” used in each 
type of plant (pp. 246-250). 
 Comparisons within the United Kingdom go back for many years, at least to Dunning 
(1958) and Dunning and Rowan (1970).  Some recent studies, such as Griffith and Simpson 
(2001), Conyon et al. (1999), and Girma et al. (2001), are based on individual establishment data 
from the Annual Business Inquiry Respondents Database (ARD). 
Dunning (1958) compared output per man-year in a sample of U.S. affiliates with that in 
the average U.K. firm (including the affiliates) in 10 industrial groups in 1950 and 1954.  He 
found that the U.S. affiliates’ productivity was higher in every one (Table 16).  Dunning and 
Rowan (1970) applied a number of different tests of efficiency to U.S. and U.K. –owned firms in   40
 
the United Kingdom.  Although each test seemed subject to one bias or another, the 
preponderance of evidence pointed to greater efficiency in the U.S.- owned firms.  Girma et al. 
(2001) found in their data set for 1991-96 that among firms with no change in ownership, 
foreign- owned firms in the United Kingdom had labor productivity about 10 per cent above that 
for domestically- owned firms and total factor productivity about 5 per cent higher.  Labor and 
total factor productivity growth rates in foreign- owned plants were higher by about 1&1/2 per 
cent per year.  Conyon et al. (1999) found that acquisitions of UK firms by foreigners led to 
increases in their profitability.  A study by Harris and Robinson (2002) of the selection of 
establishments for foreign acquisition, also based on the ARD, confirmed the suspicion that 
foreign firms selected relatively high productivity plants to acquire.  Each group of plants was 
compared to a reference group of plants belonging to UK multiplant firms that did not sell any 
plants to foreign firms during 1982-1992.  Plants that were foreign- owned during the whole 
period were more productive than those in the control group.  Plants that were sold by UK firms 
to foreign firms in 1982-86 or 1987-92 were still more productive, as were plants sold by one 
UK firm to another.  Thus, plant turnover in general seemed to involve relatively productive 
plants.  In addition, the plants that changed from domestic to foreign ownership in the second 
period had much higher capital/labor ratios than those changing domestic owners, and in this 
respect resembled those acquired by foreign owners in the first period.  
The evidence on productivity, whatever the measure, is close to unanimous on the higher 
productivity of foreign- owned plants in both developed and developing countries.  Some of that 
higher productivity, but not all in most comparisons, can be attributed to higher capital intensity 
or larger scale of production in the foreign- owned plants. 
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2. Productivity and knowledge spillovers to domestic firms 
Theories of the effect of direct investment on host countries have generally taken it for 
granted that foreign- owned firms possessed superior technology and that some of that 
technological knowledge spills over to the host country economy.  Findlay (1978) assumed that 
“…the rate of change of technical efficiency in the backward is an increasing function of the 
relative extent to which the activities of foreign firms with their superior technology pervade the 
local economy” (p. 5).  He also combined with that assumption the idea that the larger the gap in 
technology, the faster the transmission, provided that “…the disparity must not be too wide for 
the thesis to hold” (p. 2).   Wang and Blomström (1992) added, as explanations for the speed of 
transmission, the characteristics of the host country environment and host country firms.  The 
transmission of technology would be accelerated by a more competitive business environment 
and greater investment in learning and imitation by competing host country firms (p. 153). 
Most studies of productivity spillovers from foreign investment assume that they occur 
mainly in the industry in which the foreign firm operates.  Blomström and Kokko (1998) refer to 
the literature on backward linkages as examples of spillovers outside those industries, to 
supplying industries.  These arise partly from efforts by multinational firms to improve the 
quality of the intermediate products they buy locally, sometimes under duress.  However, they 
may arise without explicit help, from the competition among local firms to become the suppliers 
to the multinationals.  The only statistical examination of this issue they report is from an 
unpublished paper on Venezuela by Aitken and Harrison (1991), which reported negative effects 
of foreign direct investment in an industry on productivity in upstream industries.  The reason 
offered was that foreign firms shift the demand for intermediate inputs from domestic to foreign 
producers, reducing the scale of output, and therefore productivity, in domestic production.  The   42
 
paper did, however, report positive effects of FDI on downstream industries.  These calculations 
do not appear in the later, published, version of the paper.  On the whole, however, the 
interindustry effects of foreign participation have received a great deal of speculation, but little 
statistical testing. 
   A more recent study for Venezuela, Aitken and Harrison (1999), found that 
“…increases in foreign equity participation were correlated with increases in productivity…” for 
small plants, but that increases in foreign ownership in an industry negatively affected 
productivity in domestically- owned plants in the same industry.  The positive effects within the 
foreign plants exceeded the negative effects, but only slightly.  The positive relationships found 
by others, they argued, were due to the tendency of foreign firms to invest in high productivity 
sectors and firms (pp. 616 and 617).  The authors report similar findings for Indonesia, except 
that there the positive effects are larger than in Venezuela and the negative effects smaller (p. 
617). 
Using data for 215 industries from the Mexican Industrial Census for 1970, Blomström 
(1983) found that the labor productivity in domestically- owned plants was positively related to 
the extent of foreign presence in the industry.  That was the case with differences in capital 
intensity and in the quality of labor employed accounted for.  In a study based on the same 
Mexican census, Kokko (1994) confirmed the existence of productivity spillovers to locally- 
owned firms and found some evidence that high capital intensity in an industry and a high level 
of technology might inhibit spillovers.   A stronger conclusion was that the combination of large 
technology gaps between foreign and domestic firms and large foreign market shares, which the 
author describes as “enclave” situations, discourages spillovers.    43
 
Blomström and Wolff (1994), on the basis of Mexican Census data, concluded that 
higher foreign shares in an industry in 1970 led to higher rates of productivity growth in locally- 
owned firms over the next five years.  Local firm productivity growth was higher in industries in 
which the local firms’ productivity levels were initially closer to those of the foreign- owned 
firms (p. 270).  Higher foreign shares in an industry were also associated with faster convergence 
of Mexican industry productivity toward U.S. industry productivity levels, again more strongly 
in industries in which the initial gap was smaller (p. 275). 
Kathuria (2000), in a study of spillovers to Indian manufacturing firms, found that a 
division of the manufacturing sectors into “scientific” and “non-scientific” subgroups showed 
important differences.  He found positive spillovers in the “scientific” sectors, but none in the 
“non-scientific” ones.  One conclusion was that “…spillovers are not found to be automatic 
consequences of foreign firms’ presence, but they depend to a large extent on the efforts of local 
firms to invest in learning or R&D activities so as to decodify the spilled knowledge” (p. 364).  
He thus supports the theoretical model proposed by Wang and Blomström (1992). 
In Turkey, Erdilek finds some evidence for spillovers, although controlling for sector 
effects seems to eliminate them.  However, it is not clear whether the sector effects are, to some 
extent, swallowing up the sector foreign ownership effects. 
A pioneering attempt to measure impacts on domestic firms in developed countries was 
Caves (1974), on Canada and Australia.  He found some evidence that higher shares in an 
industry for foreign subsidiaries were weakly, and negatively, related to the profitability of 
Canadian firms, a possible indication that foreign firms raised the level of competition and 
reduced the excess profits that had been earned by their local rivals.  However, he was not 
certain that the relation was not due entirely to differences in the attainment of economies of   44
 
scale.  In Australian manufacturing, he found that “…higher subsidiary shares do apparently 
coincide with higher productivity in competing domestic firms.”  However no such relationship 
could be found between changes in foreign shares and changes in the productivity of domestic 
firms, a fact that reduced his confidence in the significance of the finding for levels (pp. 190-
191). 
A later study by Globerman (1979) for a sample of manufacturing industries in 1972, 
concluded that differences across Canadian  industries in labor productivity “…derive, in part, 
from spillover efficiency benefits associated with foreign direct investment,” (p. 53).  
Haskel, Pereira and Slaughter (2002) use British panel data to relate changes in TFP of 
domestically- owned British establishments to changes in foreign presence in the establishment’s 
industry, region, or industry in the region.  Foreign presence is measured by shares in 
employment.  Significant evidence is found for positive spillovers within industries, but regional 
variables were not important.  Positive spillovers are found to come from U.S. and French 
presence, but Japanese presence produces negative spillovers.  The authors conclude that, of the 
aggregate increase of 11 per cent in British TFP from 1972 to 1992, 5 per cent could be ascribed 
to spillovers from foreign- owned plants (p. 17). 
Girma et al. (2001) find no significant effect of foreign presence, measured by shares of 
employment or output, on the labor productivity or total factor productivity of UK firms in 
general during 1991-96.  When they relate the extent of spillovers to firm and industry 
characteristics, they find strong effects.  The higher the skill level of the industry, as measured by 
the ratio of skilled to unskilled employment, the greater the productivity spillover.  The greater 
the degree of foreign competition in the industry, the larger the spillover.  And the larger the 
individual firm’s distance from the productivity leader in its industry (the firm at the 90
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percentile in TFP), the smaller the spillover (p. 129).  Thus they point to the importance of firm 
and industry characteristics in determining the extent of spillovers, as well as, possibly, trade 
policy, as represented by import penetration levels. 
Examining changes in productivity in domestically- owned UK firms between 1989 and 
1992, Driffield (2001) finds no spillovers related to the amount of sales by foreign- owned firms 
or their R&D stock.  However, the growth of labor productivity among foreign- owned firms in 
the previous period, from 1986 to 1989, did lead to productivity growth among domestically- 
owned firms in the same industry.  He concluded that “…the foreign productivity advantage was 
responsible for an average increase in domestic productivity of 0.75 per cent a year (p. 113).  
Girma and Wakelin (2000), also using UK microdata for manufacturing establishments, found 
evidence of positive spillovers to domestic firms in the same region as the foreign firms, but 
some evidence of negative spillovers outside the regions.  They also concluded that low 
technology gaps between domestic and foreign firms and location in more technologically 
advanced regions promoted spillovers. 
Blomström and Kokko (1998) end a review of productivity spillovers to host countries by 
concluding that “…such effects exist and…they may be substantial both within and between 
industries, but there is no strong evidence on their exact nature and magnitude.”  Furthermore, 
“…the positive effects of FDI are likely to increase with the level of local capability and 
competition.” (p. 24).   The same authors, and Steven Globerman, in a later review of this 
literature (2001), summarize the “limited evidence” for developed countries as pointing to a 
dependence of productivity spillovers on the absorptive capacity of domestically- owned firms.  
They conclude that small productivity gaps encourage spillovers, while large gaps inhibit them. 
They report similar findings among developing countries, and they attribute the more mixed   46
 
results on spillovers in studies of such countries to the greater frequency of wide technology gaps 
between foreign and local firms ( pp. 42-43).   They also report that spillovers are encouraged by 
vertical linkages between MNCs and local firms, a characteristic that would also depend partly 
on local firm capabilities. 
Görg and Greenaway (2001) summarize the results of the productivity studies with 
respect to spillovers from foreign- owned to domestically- owned by saying that “…only limited 
evidence in support of positive spillovers has been reported.  Most work fails to find positive 
spillovers, with some even reporting negative spillovers, at the aggregate level” (p. 23).  In 
contrast, Görg and Strobl (2000) take spillovers for granted in their study of firm survival in 
Ireland, and find that foreign presence reduces exit by domestically- owned firms, at least in 
high-tech industries, an effect they attribute to spillovers.  Görg and Strobl (2002) find also that 
foreign presence encourages entry by domestically- owned firms. 
Görg and Greenaway are inclined to attribute the variety of findings on spillovers mainly 
to the difference between cross-section and panel data studies.  However, there is evidence that 
differences among firms in their capabilities, differences among industries in their 
characteristics, and differences among countries in both capabilities and policies may be 
important explanations for this diversity of results.  A more formal “meta-analysis” of spillover 
findings from 21 studies by Görg and Strobl (2001), using the t-statistic in spillover equations as 
the dependent variable, concluded that the use of cross-section data was a strong positive 
influence.  Of the eight studies that used panel data, four found significant negative spillovers, 
confirming the importance of the distinction between panel data and cross-section results.  
Since quite a few studies report that spillovers are discouraged by very large gaps 
between foreign and domestic firms, by restrictive trade regimes, or by other institutional factors,   47
 
the composition of the sample of countries covered by the small collection of panel data may be 
important.  Of the four developing countries with panel data included by Görg and Strobl (2001), 
Colombia, India, Morocco, and Venezuela, none are listed as “outward- oriented” during the 
period covered by the panel data in World Bank (1987).  India is called “strongly inward- 
oriented”, Colombia, “moderately inward- oriented”, and Morocco and Venezuela are not rated.   
Of 42 countries ranked by Wheeler and Mody (1992), Venezuela, is ranked in the next to lowest 
category with respect to openness.  In World Economic Forum (2002), Colombia, India, and 
Venezuela are in the lower half of developing countries with respect to “Technology” and 
“Growth Competitiveness.”   Perhaps these are not a random sample of developing countries and 
not the most likely ones in which to find spillovers. 
The studies of productivity comparisons between foreign- owned and domestically- 
owned firms and establishments have generally found that foreign- owned entities had higher 
productivity.  Almost all the studies showed that some of the higher labor productivity in the 
foreign- owned entities could be explained by their greater capital intensity, their larger size, and 
their greater use if purchased inputs.  The same variables, except for the capital intensity, and 
sometimes the purchased inputs, accounted for the differences in total factor productivity.  Even 
after these factors are removed from the comparison, it is frequently, but not always, found that 
there is a residual productivity advantage for the foreign- owned firms.  There is more logic to 
removing the influence of these other factors in comparisons within developed countries than in 
comparisons within developing countries.  In developed countries it can more easily be assumed 
that there are domestic firms capable of producing with the same capital intensity and managing 
plants of the same size.  In developing countries, there may be a better case for suggesting that 
the technological impact of the foreign firms is broader than what is measured by their total   48
 
factor productivity.  It also involves their knowledge of how to produce on a large scale and 
market the output, how to use capital intensive techniques, and how to combine local inputs with 
purchased inputs from the multinational itself or other suppliers.  If that is the case, one should 
study differences and look for spillovers not only in total factor productivity but also in plant 
size, capital intensity, and use of other inputs. 
An unusual study of spillovers to the host country that was focussed directly on spillovers 
of knowledge and did not depend on TFP measures at all was Branstetter’s (2000) examination 
of patent citations.  The higher the level of Japanese affiliates sales in the United States, lagged 
two years, the larger the number of U.S. citations to Japanese patents in U.S. firm patent 
applications.   A recent paper by Singh (2002), analyzing citations in U.S. patent filings, finds 
evidence of knowledge flows from local firms to multinationals’ foreign affiliates and from the 
affiliates to local firms, and summarizes other studies based on patent citations.  This line of 
research is a promising addition to studies of knowledge diffusion, bypassing the problems of 
productivity measurement. 
Another suggestion that common measures of technology transfer miss the point was 
made in an analysis of the impact of inward FDI on China (Chen, Chang, and Zhang, 1995).  It 
refers to “…FDI’s less than satisfactory contribution in high technology transfer to China,”   
which it explains by the high proportion of FDI coming from Hong Kong and Taiwan.  The 
impact of such investment was that it brought “… the modern concept of management and 
marketing…”  If that is the case, it is a contribution that would be missed by measures of total 
factor productivity from establishment data.  
  Productivity spillover studies typically assume that the effect on domestic firms should be 
linearly or log-linearly dependent on the foreign share of an industry.  It is not obvious that this   49
 
should be the case, particularly as the foreign share goes to high levels.  Spillover is not 
obviously maximized at a foreign share of 100 per cent.  One way this problem is recognized is 
in Kokko (1996), where industries with foreign shares above 50 per cent are dropped, being 
categorized as “enclave industries.”  
A broader problem is that there is little basis for assuming any particular form of the 
relationship.  Some mechanisms might suggest a linear relation to the foreign participation share, 
but others might suggest a strong effect from foreign entry, but little effect from changes in 
share. 
One of the few to examine productivity growth in general, rather than only spillovers to 
domestic firms was a cross-country, cross-industry study covering in nine OECD countries from 
1979 to 1991, by Baldwin, Braconier, and Forslid (1999).  They examined labor productivity 
growth in seven broad industry aggregates.  Although the title of the paper refers to spillovers, no 
distinction was made between productivity in foreign- owned firms and that in domestically- 
owned ones.  This does not match the usual definition of spillovers, in which that distinction is 
important, but the results are of interest because they measure the total impact on an industry, a 
topic rarely studied.  The authors reported that higher FDI penetration levels led to more rapid 
growth in industry labor productivity. 
A panel data study of aggregate country effects, without industry distinctions (de Mello, 
1999), found that FDI inflows raised growth in both developed and developing countries.  In 
developed countries, FDI inflows raised TFP growth, but not fixed investment, while in 
developing countries it raised fixed investment, but not TFP growth (Table 6).  An earlier survey 
of 11 studies by de Mello (1997) found a majority reporting positive effects of FDI inflows on 
growth, and stronger effect associated with greater openness or export promotion policies and   50
 
with a higher level of development.   The influence on technological change, and particularly 
domestic factor productivity was in the same direction, but observed in fewer studies, again 
varying with the same set of country characteristics (Table 3). 
As mentioned earlier, a serious problem with total factor productivity measures, 
especially in developing countries, is the weakness of the data on capital stocks.  Another 
problem with productivity comparisons and productivity spillover measures is that it is extremely 
rare to find any measure of output other than value added, or even any comparison with 
alternative measures.  The assumption underlying the measurement of output by value added, 
which is an input measure, is that the firm or establishment is operating in a competitive 
environment.  If a firm paid wages that exceeded worker productivity, for example, output would 
not be exaggerated because profits would be correspondingly reduced, and value added would 
still represent output.  However, if a firm operated in a protected market, because it was 
government- owned or because it sold to the government, or because it sold to its parent, or 
because competition was limited in other ways, its value added output measure would be 
inflated.  Similarly, a firm earning monopoly profits would appear to be highly productive even 
if wages were not inflated, because value added would be inflated.  Thus, for example, if the 
entry or growth of foreign- owned firms broke up a local firm monopoly, the decline in local 
firm monopoly profits would appear in the data disguised as a decline in their productivity 
resulting from foreign entry. 
While the technological superiority of foreign firms seems clear, as is expected on 
theoretical grounds, the evidence on spillovers is mixed.  No universal relationships are evident, 
but there is evidence that inward FDI has been most beneficial to local firms where they are not 
extremely far behind the multinationals’ affiliates.     51
 
c.  Exports and the Introduction of New Industries 
One of the main contributions of inward direct investment in some cases has been to 
introduce new industries to a country or drastically change the composition of production. Lipsey 
(2000) describes the large role of U.S. affiliates in the electronics industry in East Asia, 
especially in the early development of the industry.  The earliest data available show U.S. 
affiliates accounting for three quarters of exports in some cases, with the share declining over 
time.  Labor intensive industries, such as food textiles, and apparel, declined, while the share of 
chemical and machinery industries in exports rose to more than half (p. 163).  Some of the 
country studies in Dobson and Chia (1997) are summarized as showing that “…Foreign 
firms…saw a way to integrate these countries into worldwide networks of production….   
Foreign firms supplied the technology and the links to other parts of the production networks that 
completed the set of resources necessary for the growth of these industries” ( ibid, p. 163). 
A set of country and industry-specific case studies of “Export Catalysts in Low –Income 
Countries,” devoted to success stories in countries where underlying conditions were 
unfavorable, was collected in Rhee and Belot (1990).  Foreign direct investment was not the 
focus of the research, but the development of new industries was.  However, they refer in their 
summary to “…the critical role of transnational corporations (TNCs) in the transfer of technical, 
marketing, managerial know-how to developing countries—a role more important than the 
transfer of financial resources associated with DFI by TNCs.” (p. viii).  The development of 
plywood manufacturing and export in Indonesia in the 1980s was started by firms from Korea 
and Taiwan.  They had developed their skills when these countries replaced Japan in plywood 
manufacturing and transferred “technical, marketing, and managerial know-how through joint 
ventures…” after the home countries lost their comparative advantage as their wages rose (pp.   52
 
22-29).  A military uniform exporter from Zambia grew from a joint venture with a German firm 
that originally was aimed at the domestic market but could draw on export experience from the 
German parent when selling locally became impractical (pp. 33-34).  In Cote d’Ivoire, a joint 
venture with a French company, experienced in marketing and technically skilled, brought the 
country into the semi-processed cocoa market (pp. 39-40).  The ingredients for expansion of 
Jamaican exports of garments to the United States were provided by a joint venture with a 
Korean company that supplied “…effective management, effective training in advanced 
technology, efficiency of operations, and marketing skills and channels (p. 42).  Not all the 
catalysts described in the report involved FDI, but quite a few of them did, and the contribution 
they made seemed to have little to do with supplying capital and much to do with technology and 
marketing knowledge. 
Since export data are available in much more detail than production data in many 
countries, the development of new industries or sub-industries, or new varieties of products may 
be evident most clearly in the growth of exports.  Blomström (1990) describes the role of 
multinationals in shifting production in developing countries toward tradable goods and among 
tradables, away from import substitution and toward export markets.  The role of access to the 
international networks of parent multinationals in promoting exports by U.S. affiliates in Asia is 
assessed in Lipsey (1998).  
Ireland was an unusual example for Western Europe, in that it went from being extremely 
hostile to inward investment, until the late 1950s, to welcoming, and even favoring it by tax and 
other policies.  One could not have predicted the current comparative advantage of Ireland from 
its comparative advantage before inward investment was liberalized, which was that of an 
agricultural country.  The entrance of foreign firms, together with Ireland’s joining the European   53
 
Union, transformed the economy into one where foreign firms, exporting over 70 per cent of 
their output, accounted for two thirds of manufacturing net output and almost half of 
manufacturing employment.  In relatively high-tech industries, the foreign firms were geared 
almost entirely to export markets (Ruane and Görg, 1999, pp. 51-53). 
Most of the studies of the effects of FDI on host country exports examine the behavior of 
the affiliates themselves, generally finding that they are more export- oriented than domestically- 
owned firms.  Sousa, Greenaway, and Wakelin (2000) went beyond this question to investigate 
whether the presence and activities of foreign- owned firms affected the exporting of 
domestically- owned firms in the United Kingdom.  Using a database of individual UK- owned 
manufacturing firms from 1992 to 1996, they found that foreign firms’ R&D in the United 
Kingdom, their exporting, and their importance in UK production in an industry were all 
significantly related to the probability that a domestic firm in that industry would be an exporter.  
There were also some indications that foreign firms’ activities raised the export propensities of 
domestically- owned firms.  The only comparable study the authors cite is Aitken, Hanson, and 
Harrison (1997), for over 2,000 manufacturing establishments in Mexico in 1986-1990.  That 
study found that higher production by foreign – owned firms in a sector, as well as greater export 
activity by those firms, increased the likelihood that domestic firms would export. 
A study of China’s aggregate trade and FDI relationships with individual partner 
countries (Liu, Wang, and Wei, 2001) found, in causality tests, that China’s imports from a 
country tended to precede inward FDI from that country, and that inward FDI then preceded 
exports to the investing country.  The initial effect of inward FDI from a country on China’s 
exports to the source country was negative, but all the subsequent lagged terms were positive and   54
 
much larger, so that the net effect of inward FDI was an increase in Chinese exports to the 
investing country.     
The positive influence of inward FDI on host- country exports seems well- established, 
whatever the mechanism.  And the few studies of spillovers of exporting from affiliates to 
domestic firms point in the same direction. 
 
d.  Host Country Growth 
One of the main reasons for examining productivity spillovers from foreign- owned to 
domestically- owned firms is to understand the contribution of inward FDI to host- country 
economic growth.  If the higher productivity of the foreign firms was at the expense of lower 
productivity in domestic firms, there might be no implications for aggregate output or growth.  
There could be growth effects without spillovers, just from the operations of the foreign firms 
themselves, but that possibility is rarely explored, except by implication in studies of the impact 
of the entrance or growth of foreign firms on the output or growth of a country. 
  An optimistic appraisal of the impact of inward FDI was that of Romer (1993b), who 
suggested that, for a developing country trying to keep up with or gain on more advanced 
countries, the main obstacle was the gap in knowledge, or ideas, rather than in physical capital.  
Much of that capital was the human or organizational capital of multinational firms.  For more 
rapid growth in a developing country, “…one of the most important and easily implemented 
policies is to give foreign firms an incentive to close the idea gap, to let them make a profit by 
doing so…by creating an economic environment that offers an adequate reward to multinational 
corporations when they bring ideas from the rest of the world and put them to use with domestic 
resources…” (p. 548).   55
 
One way in which the influence of FDI on host country growth has been studied is 
through comprehensive cross- country studies in which the rate of growth of real GDP or GDP 
per capita is related to the stock or inflow of FDI.  In general, the results of these studies indicate 
that the size of inward FDI stocks or flows, relative to GDP, is not related in any consistent way 
to rates of growth.  However, most studies find that among some subsets of the world’s 
countries, FDI, or FDI in combination with some other factor or factors, is positively related to 
growth.  Blomström, Lipsey, and Zejan (1994) did find that, among developing countries, from 
1960 to 1985, ratios of FDI inflow to GDP in a five- year period were positively related to 
growth in the subsequent five- year period.  However, when the developing countries were 
divided between higher- and lower- income countries, FDI promoted growth only in the higher 
income countries.  Borensztein, De Gregorio, and Lee (1995) found, among 69 developing 
countries from 1970 to 1989, that FDI inflows, by themselves, only marginally affected growth, 
but FDI interacted with the level of education of a country’s labor force, was a significant 
positive influence.  That relationship was confirmed for FDI inflows in five- year periods and 
growth in subsequent periods in Lipsey (2000a).   
A different explanation for the variety of results was offered by Bhagwati (1978), who 
suggested that the growth effects of inward FDI could be favorable or unfavorable, depending on 
the incentives offered by host- country trade policies.  The efficiency of FDI in promoting 
growth would be increased by an export promotion policy and decreased by an import 
substitution policy.  A test of this hypothesis by Balasubramanayam, Salisu, and Sapsford (1996) 
persuaded the authors that in 10 to 18 export promotion policy developing countries, higher 
inward FDI flows were associated with faster growth.  No effect was found in the remaining 
developing countries, presumably following import substitution trade policies.   56
 
A different explanation for the variety of experience with FDI is offered by Alfaro, 
Chanda, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Sayek (2002).  They find, in a regression analysis for the period 
1975-1995 as a whole, and using various measures of financial development, that the existence 
and extent of local financial markets is an important determinant of the extent to which FDI 
affects growth.  That idea, which they trace back to Goldsmith (1969), among others, is her 
based on the proposition that in the absence or weakness of local financial markets, local firms 
are unable to take advantage of the various kinds of knowledge that they gain from the presence 
of foreign firms. 
 A recent study including developed and developing countries by Carkovic and Levine 
(2000) finds no significant effect of FDI inflows over the whole period, 1960- 1995, and only 
irregularly significant effects in five- year periods.  They find that none of the variables found in 
other studies consistently determine the effect of FDI on growth, although some are significant in 
some combinations of conditioning variables.   
In a narrower group of countries, 25 Central and Eastern European and former Soviet 
transition countries, Campos and Kinoshita (2002) find that FDI “…is a crucially important 
explanatory variable for growth…”  The finding survives “…correcting for reverse causality, 
endogeneity, and omitted variable bias…” (p. 22).   They allege that FDI represents more of a 
pure transfer of technology in these transition countries than in most developing countries, 
because these countries were industrialized and had relatively well educated labor forces. 
As with the studies of wage and productivity spillovers, those of the effects of FDI inflow 
on economic growth are inconclusive.  Almost all find positive effects in some periods, or 
among some groups of countries, in some specifications, but one cannot say from these studies 
that there are universal effects.  There are periods, industries, and countries where FDI seems to   57
 
have little relation to growth, especially when other factors, mostly related to FDI also are 
included as explanations. 
 
V. Conclusions 
  Among the early fears about the effects of the growth of multinationals on their home 
countries, the worry that they would cause exports from the home country and aggregate 
employment to fall has mostly dissipated.  There are some indications that multinational 
operations have led to a shift toward more capital- intensive and skill- intensive production in the 
United States, as labor- intensive, and particularly unskilled labor- intensive production has been 
allocated to affiliates in developing countries.  The alternative to this shift may have been a shift 
to non- affiliated firms in those countries.  However, even that reallocation does not appear to 
have occurred in Sweden or Japan, so it cannot be considered a universal consequence of 
multinational operations. 
  Within host countries, it has been abundantly shown that foreign- owned firms pay higher 
wages than domestically- owned firms.  They do so for many reasons.  Foreign- owned firms 
tend to be in higher wage sectors of the economy.  They tend to hire more educated and better- 
qualified workers than locally- owned firms in their industries, and they tend to be larger, more 
capital- intensive, and more intensive in their use of intermediate products.  Beyond that, there is 
some evidence that foreign- owned firms pay a higher price for labor, in the sense of paying 
more for a worker of given quality, but there are not many studies that include data on worker 
characteristics. 
  Evidence on wage spillovers, that is, effects of foreign entry or participation in an 
industry or region, or industry within a region, on the wages paid by domestically- owned firms,   58
 
is sparse, and not conclusive as to direction.  However, there is more evidence that, whatever the 
extent and direction of spillovers to domestically- owned plants, the effect of foreign firms’ 
presence is to raise the average level of wages.  The effect may come simply from higher wages 
in the foreign– owned operations, even without any effect on locally- owned ones.  It might 
come from positive spillovers to locally- owned plants.  Or it may come from the effects of the 
increased demand for labor, even if there is no difference in wage levels between foreign- owned 
and domestically- owned plants. 
  Many wage studies, if they are based on individual firm or establishment data, include 
controls for plant size and, where possible, for capital intensity and other plant characteristics.  
They attempt in this way to learn whether wage levels reflect these characteristics other than 
foreignness itself, since wage levels are, for example, almost always positively associated with 
establishment or firm size.  From a policy maker’s point of view, this distillation of the effects of 
pure foreignness may not be relevant.  An expansion of foreign presence may be desirable 
because foreign firms bring larger scale, more capital-intensive, or more technically advanced 
methods of production.  It does not matter that an identical domestic firm would produce the 
same results, because there may not be any such firms, or they may not find it profitable to make 
these same investments. 
  Even if foreign entry and larger foreign shares of production almost always raise wage 
levels, there are some host country losers from their participation.  Small or inefficient local 
firms may be forced to contract or leave the industry altogether.  That may be viewed as a 
healthy redeployment of capital, but it is an explanation for some host country opposition to 
foreign multinationals.   59
 
  Much more effort has gone into productivity comparisons than into wage comparisons, 
and most of these are based on total factor productivity when capital data are available or can be 
estimated in some way.  Productivity comparisons between foreign- owned and domestically- 
owned firms or establishments almost always find that the foreign- owned firms have higher 
productivity levels.  As with the wage comparisons, some of the differences can be associated 
with the larger scale of production in foreign- owned plants. 
  Evidence on spillovers of superior foreign productivity to domestically- owned firms is 
mixed.  Some observers conclude that there is substantial evidence for positive spillovers and 
others see the evidence as inconclusive.  However, the mixed story for spillovers, combined with 
the strong evidence for superior productivity in foreign- owned firms, suggests that overall 
productivity is improved by the presence of foreign- owned operations, although that question is 
rarely, if ever, examined. 
   In many of these productivity studies there has been a substantial effort to calculate total 
factor productivity comparisons, rather than labor productivity comparisons, and to remove the 
influence of firm or establishment size.  An effort is made, in effect, to learn whether foreign and 
domestic firms are on different production functions.  It is not always clear why it is so important 
to measure the effect of foreignness alone, untainted by differences in capital intensity and size.  
Much of the growth of presently developed countries came from increases in the scale of 
production and in its capital intensity.  Perhaps the contribution of foreign firms comes partly by 
introducing larger scale or more capital intensive methods of production, or differences in 
technology may be inextricably tied to differences in scale and capital intensity. 
  One effect of foreign entry that is widely accepted is the introduction of new industries or 
products to the host- country economy and the tighter linking of the host country to the world   60
 
trading system.  The contribution of the foreign- owned firms is mainly of knowledge, 
particularly knowledge of demand in the world market, and knowledge about how the host 
country can find a place in the worldwide allocation of intermediate steps in the path of 
production that can be geographically separated.  Through both productivity effects and the 
development of new (to the host country) products, inward direct investment is associated with 
faster economic growth. 
  One issue that is missing from the discussion of effects of FDI, a strange omission from a 
literature dominated by economists, is the impact on consumers.  There could be effects on home 
country consumers from imports of cheaper goods produced by foreign affiliates.  There could 
be effects on host country consumers from more efficient production of goods and services sold 
locally and from the weakening of local producer monopoly positions.  There have been analyses 
in the trade literature of consumer gains from imports, but these are not usually associated with 
affiliate production abroad.  I have seen no studies of host countries that relate consumer prices 
to the presence or activities of foreign affiliates. 
  The association of FDI with more trade and faster economic growth would not 
necessarily please critics of multinationals.  Trade links reduce the freedom of action of a 
country’s government domestically, if not that of its people.  Fast growth involves disruptions 
and the destruction of the value of old techniques of production and old skills.  Those who value 
stability over economic progress will not be convinced of the worth of the gifts brought by 
foreign involvement.  That is especially true if the gains are captured by small elements of the 
population or if no effort is made to soften the impact of the inevitable losses.    61
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